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In the Supreme Court 
of the 
State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
JOHN F. LEDKINS 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 8537 
Brief of Defendant and Appellant 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant and appellant herein, John F. Ledkins, 
hereinafter referred to as defendant, was originally charged 
with KNOWINGLY VIOLATING RULES AND REGULA-
TIONS WHILE A GUARD AT THE UTAH STATE 
PRISON (R. 2 & 7). Later at the preliminary hearing stage, 
a second count was added charging the defendant with AT-
TEMPTING TO SUPPLY DRUGS TO AN INMATE (R. 
2 & 7). On Motion of the State, the first count was dismissed 
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(R. 3). After oral argument to the comrruttlng magistrate, 
Judge Leland Larsen, concerning the validity of the statutes 
in question, the defendant was bound over to the District 
Court on the second count. 
The District Attorney filed an Information charging the 
defendant of KNOWINGLY VIOLATING RULES AND 
REGULATIONS WHILE A GUARD AT THE UTAH 
STATE PRISON by wilfully, knowingly attempt to supply 
drugs to an inmate (R. 8). At time of arraignment, the de-
fendant filed a Demand for Bill of Particulars, Motion to 
Quash and Motion to Dismiss (R. 14-21). A Bill of Par-
ticulars was furnished the defendant by the District Attorney 
(R. 11 & 13). 
A date was set for the argument of defendant's Motion 
to Quash and Motion to Dismiss, and on said day the said 
Motions were duly argued and submitted to the Court (R. 25-
47). At that time the District Attorney dismissed the count of 
KNOWINGLY VIOLATING RULES AND REGULATIONS 
WHILE A GUARD AT THE UTAH STATE PRISON 
(R. 26). Upon leave of Court, the District Attorney was grant-
ed permission to amend the Information (R. 22 & 26). 
Upon completion of oral argument, the Court permitted 
defendant to file a Brief on the following question: Does par-
tial invalidity of a criminal statute invalidate the whole statute, 
or may the Court eliminate those provisions of the section 
which are unconstitutional and leave standing that portion of 
a section which would have been constitutional? (R. 22 & 
44-47). 
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Defendant submitted a written Brief (not included in the 
record). The Court denied defendant's Motions (R. 23) and 
defendant was granted time in which to file an appeal to the 
Supreme Court. 
The defendant is presently charged in the Amended In-
formation of the crime of ATTEMPTING TO GIVE OR 
SELL A DRUG TO AN INMATE OF THE UTAH STATE 
PRISON, WHILE A GUARD, in violation of Title 64, Chapter 
9, Sections 41 and 38, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (R. 24). 
Defendant filed a Petition for Intermediate Appeal, to-
gether with a Memorandum supporting said Petition (R. 
59-66). On the 29th day of May, 1956, the Supreme Court 
granted an Interlocutory Appeal (R. 68). This case now has 
been continued without date pending determination of appeal 
(R. 79). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT NO. I 
THAT THE COURT TRYING THE CAUSE HAS NO 
JURISDICTION OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED OR OF 
THE PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT BECAUSE THE 
STATUTES UNDER WHICH THE DEFENDANT IS 
CHARGED ARE VOID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN 
THAT THEY ARE VAGUE, INDEFINITE, UNCERTAIN, 
AMBIGUOUS AND ARE INCONSISTENT WITH OTHER 
SECTIONS OF THE UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, 
APPLICABLE TO THE UTAH STATE PRISON, AND IS 
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AN IMPROPER DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POW-
ERS, UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION I, ARTICLE 
V OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
POINT NO. II 
DOES PARTIAL INVALIDITY OF A CRIMINAL 
STATUTE INVALIDATE THE WHOLE STATUTE, OR 
MAY THE COURT ELIMINATE THOSE PROVISIONS 
OF THE SECTION WHICH ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
AND LEAVE STANDING THAT PORTION OF A SEC-
TION WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN CONSTITUTIONAL 
IF ENACTED ALONE? 
POINT NO. III 
THAT THE DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE A PRE-
LIMINARY-HEARING AS REQUIRED BY LAW IN THAT 
HE WAS NOT BOUND OVER ON THE CHARGE OF 
ATTEMPTING TO GIVE OR SELL A DRUG TO AN IN-
MATE OF THE STATE PRISON, WHILE A GUARD. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. I 
THAT THE COURT TRYING THE CAUSE HAS NO 
JURISDICTION OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED OR OF 
THE PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT BECAUSE THE 
STATUTES UNDER WHICH THE DEFENDANT IS 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CHARGED ARE VOID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN 
THAT THEY ARE VAGUE, INDEFINITE, UNCERTAIN, 
AMBIGUOUS AND ARE INCONSISTENT WITH OTHER 
SECTIONS OF THE UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, 
APPLICABLE TO THE UTAH STATE PRISON, AND IS 
AN IMPROPER DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POW-
ERS, UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION I, ARTICLE 
V OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
The statutes under which the defendant is charged are as 
follows: 
"64-9-38. Duties of guards and keepers-Penalty for 
breach.-The guards, keepers and employees of the 
state prison must be ready at all times to attend to any 
duty required of them by the warden. The several 
keepers and guards are hereby expressly charged with 
all the duties and responsibilities of jailers. Any guard, 
keeper or other employee of the state prison who know-
ingly violates any rule or regulation adopted by the 
board, or who violates any of the provisions of this 
chapter, or who neglects to perform the duties required 
of him by the rules and regulations of the prison or 
by the provisions of this chapter, is guilty of a felony, 
and may be punished by a fine not exceeding $1,000 
or by imprisonment in the state prison for a period not 
exceeding three years, or by both such fine and imprison-
ment. 
"64-9-41. Use of liquors and drugs forbidden.-No 
spiritous or fermented liquor, drug, medicine or poison 
shall, on any pretense whatever, be sold or given away 
in the prison or in any building appurtenant thereto, 
or on the land granted to the state for the use and 
benefit of the prison; and no such drug or medicine 
shall be given to, or suffered to be used by, any con-
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viet in the prison unless he is ill, and then only under 
under the special direction of the prison physician." 
Both of these statutes are challenged as to their validity 
on constitutional grounds for many different reasons and each 
of the statutes will be discussed separately for the purpose 
of clarity. The first section cited will be referred to hereinafter 
I 
as the "section dealing with the duties of guards and keepers." 
The second section cited will be referred to hereinafter as the 
"section dealing with the use of drugs." 
The constitutionality of the section dealing with the duties 
of guards and keepers is challenged upon the following 
grounds, anyone of which is sufficient to declare the section 
void: 
1. It is vague and ambiguous, 
2. It is indefinite, 
3. It is uncertain, 
4. It is inconsistent with other sections of the Utah Code 
applicable to the Utah State Prison, and 
5. It is an improper delegation of legislative powers. 
This section begins ·'The guards, keepers and employees 
of the state prison must be ready at all times to attend to any 
duty required of them by the warden." There is no dear 
definition or limitation of the duties required, but, on the 
contrary, speaks of any duty required by the warden. Under 
this provision, the warden is the sovereign himself. Persons 
at the prison must perform their activities at the peril of com-
mitting a felony. It is a delegation of power by the legislature 
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of powers unheard of in the annals of law. A guard could be 
subjected to a felony prosecution for failure to arrive at work 
on time if he were ill or unavoidably detained. Said guard 
could conceivably be subjected to a felony for engaging in an 
exciting conversation while on duty. Such a provision violates 
all of the requirements of valid legislation. 
This section proceeds as follows: ''The several keepers 
and guards are hereby expressly charged with all the duties 
and responsibilities of jailers." The legislature has failed to 
spell out with any certainty what the duties and responsibilities 
of jailers are. Men of common intelligence must guess at its 
meaning at their peril of a felony prosecution and will differ 
as to its application and meaning. 
The next sentence of this section is long and contains 
various phrases, including the punishment for violation. It 
begins: "Any guard, keeper or other employee of the state 
prison who knowingly violates any rule or regulation adopted 
by the board ... ". This phrase is another improper delegation 
by the legislature of its power to determine what acts con-
stitute a felony. A few examples from the "Rules and Regu-
lations Governing Officers of the Utah State Prison" offered 
into evidence by the State as Exhibit "A" at the preliminary 
hearing will clearly emphasize the challenges made to this 
section (R. 84). Paragraph 3 of said Rules provides as follows: 
"COURTESY. Courtesy is demanded at all times and 
fellow officers should be treated with mutual respect 
and kindness. The discussion of controversial subjects 
shall be avoided at all times. The conduct of an officer 
of the institution should be that of a gentleman at all 
times and under all conditions." 
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Paragraph 4 of said Rules provides as follows: 
"SMOKING ON DUTY. Smoking while on duty is 
prohibited, except in properly designated areas. No 
officer will attempt to carry on a conversation or meet 
a fellow-officer or visitor with a cigarette, cigar or pipe 
in his mouth; nor will he fail to remove his cap when 
introduced to ladies; or upon entering the office of a 
superior." 
Paragraph 5 of said Rules provides as follows: 
"PROPER CONDUCT ON DUTY. All officers shall, 
while within the prison, refrain from whistling, 
scuffling, immoderate laughter, boisterous conversa-
tion, exciting discussions, and all other acts which 
might tend to disturb the harmony and good order of 
the institution." 
Paragraph 38 of said Rules provides as follows: 
"PARKING FACILITIES. Parking facilities are fur-
nished for automobiles. The keys to all cars shall be 
removed and the doors to cars shall be kept locked at 
all times." · 
A cursory examination by the Court of said Rules and 
Regulations will clearly show the dangerous results to be had 
if they were held to be a proper delegation of legislative 
powers. 
The next phrase of this section provides as follows: "or 
who violates any of the provisions of this chapter, . . . ". A 
thorough reading of the entire chapter will reveal that most 
sections deal with the administration of the prison, such as 
residence of warden, members and powers of the board of 
corrections, bonds required, keeping of journals and records 
10 
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of the prison, appointment of parole agents, finances of prison, 
duties of clerk and prison physician, meetings, visitors, library, 
labeling of goods made by the prisoners and various other 
matters. Most of the sections are vague, administrative and 
are not criminal in nature with discretion left to the board of 
corrections and warden to prescribe methods of application. 
The enforcement of this section would place the burden of 
perfection upon all persons connected with the prison and 
would continually subject them to a felony prosecution. The 
legislature certainly did not intend to make every infraction 
of these various sections in the chapter to be a felony and 
eliminate any discretion by the board or warden to otherwise 
discipline the employees. 
This sentence continues as follows: "or who neglects to 
perform the duties required of him by the rules and regulations 
of the prison or by the provisions of this chapter, is guilty of a 
felony, ... ". This phrase makes pure negligence or neglect 
an act constituting a felony. Under such a provision, a guard 
who neglects to lock his car when he parks it in the parking 
lot would be guilty of a felony. 
This sentence and the balance of the section proceeds to 
set forth the penalty for any breach of this section. The penalty 
for breach itself is inconsistent with the other provisions in 
this chapter as to enforcement of the various sections of the 
chapter. The second paragraph of Title 64-9-2, Utah Code 
Annotated, 195 3, provides as follows: 
"The board of corrections is empowered and di-
rected, among other things, . . . to make and enforce 
all such general rules for the government and discipline 
, 1 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of the prison, as it may deem expedient, and from time 
to time to change and amend the same; . . . '' 
Title 64-9-13 (2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, pertaining to 
the general duties of the warden provide as follows: 
"It shall be the duty of the warden under the rules 
and regulations adopted by the board for the govern-
ment of the prison: ( 2) To give necessary directions to 
all inferior officers, keepers and guards, and to ascer-
tain whether they have been careful and vigilant in 
their respective duties." 
Title 64-9-64, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, also provides as 
follows: 
"Any person, firm, or corporation, which violates any 
of the provisions of this act shall be guilty of a mis-
demeanor.'' 
Such provisions as to enforcement and penalty of a vio-
lation of the sections of this chapter are inconsistent with each 
other and create an ambiguity and uncertainty and are not sus-
ceptible of uniform interpretation and application by those 
charged with the responsibility of applying and enforcing 
the provisions .of this chapter. These provisions permit an 
administrative agency, an employee of the state, or the law 
enforcement branch of the state, the right and discretion to 
determine what are the violations of the various sections in 
this title and whether violators should be merely disciplined, 
charged with a felony, or charged with a misdemeanor. 
The section dealing with the use of drugs is challenged 
upon the following grounds: 
12 
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1. It is vague and ambiguous, 
2. It is uncertain, and 
3. It is indefinite. 
This section consists of one sentence containing two ( 2) 
separate clauses separated by a semi-colon. The .first phrase 
reads as follows: "No spirituous or fermented liquor, drug, 
medicine or poison shall, on any pretense whatever, be sold 
or given away in the prison or in any building appurtenant 
thereto, or on the land granted to the state for the use and 
benefit of the prison; ... ". This clause is vague, ambiguous, 
uncertain and indefinite in meaning. What is meant by sold 
or given away? Does it mean that no liquor, drug, medicine 
or poison can be brought on the prison at all ? If such items 
are brought on to the prison property, then how are they placed 
in the hands of the persons to use them? How can the necessary 
insect eradication at the prison be carried out and how can 
the fruit trees be sprayed with insecticides? Is it a felony to 
have a Coca Cola dispensing machine in the entrance lobby of 
the prison for the use of prison employees and visitors? Just 
what is the legislature intending to prohibit, and whom is the 
legislature intending to punish? It is stated at 22 C.J.S. at page 
71 and 72 as follows: 
"In creating an offense which was not a crime at 
common law, a statute must, of course, be sufficiently 
certain to show what the legislature intended to pro-
hibit and punish, otherwise it will be void for uncer-
tainty ... " 
The second clause of this section reads as follows: "and 
no such drug or medicine shall be given to, or suffered to be 
13 
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used by, any convict in the prison unless he is ill, and then only 
under the special direction of the prison physican." This clause 
for some reason leaves out the items of liquor and poison and 
does not provide for the use of such items. The entire section 
does not authorize the use of any drugs or medicines by anyone 
else except the convicts. This clause is also vague, ambiguous, 
uncertain and indefinite of meaning even when read with the 
preceding clause. Would a guard be guilty of a felony if he 
carried a box of aspirins on the prison property and gave one 
to a fellow guard who had a headache? What offense do the 
dispensary personnel commit when they dispense drugs in the 
absence of the prison physican? 
Perhaps the best example of how uncertain of interpre-
tation this section is, is to read paragraph 11 of the Rules and 
Regulations Governing Officers of Utah State Prison offered 
into evidence as Exhibit "A" by the State. This regulation reads 
as follows: 
"SEDATIVES, NARCOTICS OR POISONS. At no 
time shall sedatives, narcotics or poisons be permitted 
to fall into the hands of inmates; nor shall such items 
be permitted on assignments where food is being 
handled or stored; nor allowed in the institution proper 
unless authorized by the prison physician or warden. 
All poisons will be kept in vaults provided for that 
purpose; all drugs and medicines will be administered 
under the direct supervision of an officer. Each officer 
on all shifts must familiarize himself with instructions 
concerning drugs to be administered as prescribed by 
the prison physician.'' 
There is an apparent conflict in the wording of the statute 
and the interpretation and regulation of the prison. It appears 
14 
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that a guard would be at his peril in any course of conduct 
which he may take in the handling and dispensing of these 
items. 
In the recent case of State v. Packard, ____ Utah ____ , 250 
P. 2d 561, the Utah Supreme Court in an excellent decision 
very clearly sets forth the requirements of valid legislation 
and consolidated a fairly complete list of authorities on the 
question of uncertainty and vagueness in statutes. The Court 
adopted, as it has a number of times, the principle set forth 
in the case of Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 
385, 46 S. Ct. 126, 127, 70 L. Ed. 322, as follows: 
" .. a statute which either forbids or requires the doing 
of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelli-
gence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ 
as to its application violates the first essential of due 
process of law . . . " 
Justice Crockett, in State v. Packard, sets forth the tests 
a statute must meet in order to be valid and wrote as follows: 
"Concerning the question of uncertainty or vague-
ness of statutes, the authorities seem to be in accord 
that the test a statute must meet to be valid is: It must 
be sufficiently definite (a) to inform persons of ordi-
nary intelligence, who would be law abiding, what 
their conduct must be to conform to its requirements; 
(b) to advise a defendant accused of violating it just 
what constitutes the offense with which he is charged, 
and (c) to be susceptible of uniform interpretation and 
application by those charged with responsibility of 
applying and enforcing it." 
The statutes in question here obviously do not meet the 
tests concerning uncertainty and vagueness. In addition, these 
15 
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statutes are ambiguous, are inconsistent with other provisions 
of the same chapter, and constitute an improper delegation of 
legislative powers. Although the courts have gone a Jong way 
in permitting a delegation of certain powers to an administra-
tive agency, the courts have never permitted the delegation of 
powers to any agency to prescribe rules and regulations, the 
violation of which is a felony. 
POINT NO. II 
DOES PARTIAL INVALIDITY OF A CRIMINAL 
STATUTE INVALIDATE THE WHOLE STATUTE, OR 
MAY THE COURT ELIMINATE THOSE PROVISIONS 
OF THE SECTION WHICH ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
AND LEAVE STANDING THAT PORTION OF A SEC-
TION WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN CONSTITUTIONAL 
IF ENACTED ALONE? 
This issue was raised by the lower court at the time the 
Motions to Quash and to Dismiss were argued. Judge Van Cott 
reasoned that assuming the objections raised against Title 64-9-
38, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, were for the most part valid 
objections, could not the court eliminate the bad parts of the 
section and make it read .. Any guard who violates any provi-
sion of this chapter is guilty of a felony." (R. 40 & 41). We 
have argued and contended in the argument on Point I that 
even that phrase is invalid as being indefinite and inconsistent 
with other penalty provisions in other sections of the same 
chapter. We urge, in addition, that if portions of a criminal 
statute are invalid, that any attempt by the court to save a sole 
16 
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phrase of Section 38 would constitute a gross emasculation 
of the section and would in effect be judicial legislation of a 
criminal statute. 
The sections under question are criminal sections m a 
chapter primarily administrative dealing with the state prison. 
Penal sections are to be construed strictly and in favor of the 
accused and in favor of liberty. Sutherland in his text called 
"Statutory Construction," in Chapter IX, deals with the issue 
raised herein, to wit: Statutes void in part. The Court is ex-
pressly invited to read paragraph 172 therein dealing with 
penal statutes. Mr. Sutherland expresses the law that statutes 
of a civil nature within certain limitations are severable when 
part is void and part is valid, "But the rule is more stringent 
in regard to criminal statutes. As said by Johnson, J., in Wyne-
hamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 378, 427: 
'Laws in relation to civil rights are sometimes held 
to be unconstitutional, in so far as they affect the rights 
of certain persons, and valid in respect to others. This 
is done mainly upon the ground that the courts will 
not construe them to relate to such cases as the legis-
lature had not power to act upon. To statutes creating 
criminal offenses, such a rule of construction ought 
not to be applied, and I cannot find any trace of its 
having been applied. It is of the highest importance to 
the administration of criminal justice that acts creating 
crimes should be certain in their terms and plain in 
their application; and it would be in no small degree 
unseemly that courts should be called upon, in ad-
ministering the criminal law, to adjudge an act creating 
offenses at one time valid, and at another time void. 
It must, I think, stand as it has been enacted, or not 
stand at all." ' 
17 
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The United States Supreme Court has discussed this sub-
ject and the leading case concerning it is United States v. 
Reese, 92 U. S. 214, 23 L. Ed. 563. Chief Justice Waite ren-
dered the opinion and said as follows: 
"We are, therefore, directly called upon to decide 
whether a penal statute enacted by Congress, with its 
limited powers, ·which is in general language broad 
enough to cover wrongful acts without as well as 
within the constitutional jurisdiction, can be limited 
by judicial construction so as to make it operate only 
on that which Congress may rightfully prohibit and 
punish. For this purpose, we must take these sections 
of the statute as they are. We are not able to reject a 
part which is unconstitutional, and retain the remainder, 
because it is not possible to separate that which is un-
constitutional, and retain the remainder, because it is 
not possible to separate that which is unconstitutional, 
if there be any such, from that which is not. The pro-
posed effect is not to be attained by striking out or 
disregarding words that are in the section, but by in-
serting those that are not now there. Each of the sec-
tions must stand as a whole, or fall altogether. The 
language is plain. There is no room for construction, 
unless it be as to the effect of the Constitution . . . 
"It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature 
could set a net large enough to catch all possible offend-
ers, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say 
who could be rightfully detained and who should be 
set at large. This would, to some extent, substitute the 
judicial for the legislative department of the govern-
ment ... " 
United States v. Reese is still followed by the United 
States Supreme Court and one of the last cases is Yu Cong 
Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U. S. 500, 70 L. Ed. 1059. In that case 
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Chief Justice Taft delivered the opinion and after citing United 
States v. Reese and a. host of federal and state cases said: 
"The effect of the authorities we have quoted is 
clear to the point that we may not in a criminal statute 
reduce its generally inclusive terms so as to limit its 
application to only that class of cases which it was 
within the power of the legislature to enact, and thus 
save the statute from invalidity." 
The United States v. Reese case has been followed in Utah 
and has been quoted even though the cases under discussion 
were civil in nature. United States v. Reese was quoted by 
Judge Elias Hansen in a license tax case of North Tintic Mining 
Company v. Crockett, 75 Utah 259, 284 Pac. 328. The Utah 
Supreme Court has on one other occasion had an opportunity 
to discuss the severability question involving a banking statute 
in the case of Union Trust Company v. Simmons, 116 Utah 
422, 211 Pac. 2d 190. 
The Utah cases above cited deal with civil statutes which 
within certain limitations and clear legislative intent may be 
severable. In the case at hand, however, the question of sever-
ability deals with a criminal statute and any construction given 
must be strict and in favor of the accused and of liberty. The 
citations contained herein pertaining to criminal law clearly 
establish that if part of a criminal section is void, the whole 
section must fail. Such law is sound. A person should definitely 
know the offense with which he is charged and not have it 
left up to the courts to legislate statutory crimes. 
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POINT NO. III 
THAT THE DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE A PRE-
LIMINARY HEARING AS REQUIRED BY LAW IN THAT 
HE WAS NOT BOUND OVER ON THE CHARGE OF 
ATTEMPTING TO GIVE OR SELL A DRUG TO AN IN-
MATE OF THE STATE PRISON, WHILE A GUARD. 
Apparently due to the vagueness, indefiniteness and un-
certainty of the meaning and wording of the sections discussed 
herein and in a frantic effort to find some charge which they 
may stick against the defendant, the State has amended and 
amended the Complaints and Informations filed· against the 
defendant (R. 2, 7, 8 & 24). At the preliminary hearing the 
defendant was finally bound over on the Amended Complaint 
of ATTEMPTING TO SUPPLY DRUGS TO AN INMATE 
(R. 3 & 7). The Amended Information now on file, to which 
the defendant objected (R. 26), now charges the defendant 
of ATTEMPTING TO GIVE OR SELL DRUGS TO AN 
INMATE (R. 24). 
It will be noted that defendant was bound over at the 
preliminary hearing on an attempt TO SUPPLY drugs to an 
inmate. He is presently charged with an attempt TO GIVE 
OR SELL drugs to an inmate. This raises the question of 
what is meant by give or sell. Is the word supply synonymous 
with the word give or sell? 
If the words give, sell and supply are interchangeable and 
synonymous with each other, that adds impetus to the argu-
ments set forth in Point No. I as to the uncertainty of meaning 
of words give or sell in said section of the statute. 
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If the word supply is different from the meaning of give 
or sell, then the defendant has not had a preliminary hearing 
on the present charge as provided by Title 77-15, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953. 
This is a dilemma of which the defendant cannot afford 
a satisfactory solution and serves to emphasize the points raised 
in the argument of Point No. I. 
CONCLUSION 
The statutes under which the defendant is charged herein 
have so many defects that a volume on statutory construction 
could have been written fully discussing each word and phrase 
of these sections. Because of the variety and great number of 
defects in these sections, an attempt has been made herein to 
only make a brief mention of the major defects present. 
This is not a case where a single word or comma is in-
definite or uncertain, but is a case where practically every 
sentence and phrase is fraught with flagrant violations of good 
and valid criminal legislation. The Court itself may well find 
additional objections to these sections which are not even men-
tioned herein. 
These sections are without a doubt a classic example of 
how not to draft criminal legislation. The words and phrases 
are vague, indefinite, ambiguous, uncertain, the penalty pro-
vided in the section dealing with the duties of guards and 
keepers is inconsistent with other penalty provisions in the 
chapter and the provisions dealing with delegation of powers 
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amount to a complete usurpation of legislative authority in 
making and defining crimes constituting a felony or misde-
meanor. 
It is readily apparent that the keepers, guards, employees, 
warden and even the board of corrections· are continually vio-
lating the terms of these statutes by the improper application 
or the lack of application of the provisions of this chapter. 
The law is for all. The law must be such that all the 
people can understand it. It must be of uniform application. 
Power should never be placed in one department of govern-
ment where the laws can be made, can be interpreted and 
enforced, all at the same time. Such a situation is wholly re-
pugnant to the spirit, intent and wording of the constitutions 
of the state and nation. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAHL AND SAGERS 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant 
EVERETT E. DAHL 
VICTOR G. SAGERS 
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